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Seek and You Shall Find: Google’s AdWords and the Nominative Functional Fair Use Defense 
 
I.    Introduction: Google AdWords 
 
 Google has become a household name since its enactment in 1998.
1  The verb form ‘to 
google’ was added to the Oxford English dictionary in 2006.2  Using Google's website, an 
individual can enter an company's name or trademark into Google's search engine and launch a 
search.
3
  Google's operating system responds to a search request in two ways.
4
  First, based on 
predetermined algorithms, Google provides a list of websites based on relevancy to a consumer’s 
entered search terms.
5
  Prospective purchasers can search for a good or service and then be 
linked to that provider’s website via Google, enabling the searcher to obtain information about 
products and possibly purchase items.
6
  Secondly, Google provides for context-based 
advertising.
7
  If Google’s predetermined algorithm deems an ad likely to be relevant to a 
searcher, Google places a link to that website if a company has purchased placement of its ads 
from Google.
8
   
 One of Google's most profitable features is its’ advertising program, Google AdWords, 
through which advertisers purchase specific terms.
9
  When consumers enter a specified search 
term, the keyword triggers the display of the advertiser's ad and link.
10
  Advertisers pay Google 
                                                          
1
 Google History, Google, http://www.google.com/corporate/history.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
2
 See Anders Bylund, To Google or Not to Google, Motley Fool (July 5, 2006), 
http://www.fool.com/investing/dividends-income/2006/07/05/to-google-or-not-to-google.aspx; see also Google 
Definition, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2006). 
3
 Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 2009). 
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Id. 
7
 Id. 
8
 Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 125. 
9
 Id. 
10
 Id. 
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1 
based on the number of times searchers “click” on the advertiser's website.11  Google places 
these paid for advertisements typically in the most prominent portions of the search webpage, 
thus possibly misleading searchers as to what results are the most relevant to their query as 
opposed to those purchased by the highest-bidding advertiser.
12
  
 
Every year, businesses spend billions of dollars purchasing trademarks on Google 
AdWords.
13
  The reason for this is simple: without purchasing these brand-specific terms, 
competitors will likely pay for these terms and will be at the top of a consumer search, regardless 
of relevance.
14
  While this situation is not ideal for businesses, some commentators have gone so 
far as to assert that this is coercion simply because companies have no choice but to purchase 
their brand names to protect their rights.
15
  Due to the structure of AdWords’ payment system, 
Google has monetary incentive to encourage keywords that will result in more clicks on 
advertisements.
16
  Purchasers of Google’s AdWords program expect the ads to provide value and 
profit and lead to more traffic at their website and thus more purchases.
17
  Most of Google is 
funded by advertisement revenue.
18
  Google makes essentially all of its profits from the 
advertisement revenue, for example in 2004, Google reported $3.1 billion in revenue while only 
$50,000 of that was not from advertising revenue.
19
  In fact, advertisers pay Google for each 
click by a user on their sponsored link.
20
 Google has instituted a keyword suggestion tool that 
allows for information based on past searches to be gathered and to create more exposure for the 
                                                          
11
 Id. 
12
 Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 126. 
13
 Id. 
14
 David Rodnitzky, How to ‘Protect’ Brand Keywords for Less, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 24, 2012 9:51 AM), 
http://searchengineland.com/how-to-protect-brand-keywords-for-less-121566. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 126. 
17
 Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 125. 
18
 Id. at 126. Rescuecom alleged that AdWords accounted for 97% of Google revenue. 
19
 Stephanie Yu Lim, Can Goggle Be Liable for Trademark Infringement? A Look at the “Trademark Use” 
Requirement as Applied to Google AdWords, 14 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 265, 269 (2007). 
20
 Id. 
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2 
advertiser and more revenue for Google.
21
 When Google began allowing the purchase of 
keyword triggers, Google was well aware of the possibility of “subject[ion] to more trademark 
infringement lawsuits” but was willing to take the risk for potential monetary gain.22  
 As a result of the monetary incentive, Google has implemented a Keyword Suggestion 
tool, which due to information gathered by previous searches, suggests keywords which will 
likely lead to advertisement results.
23
  This means that someone who searches for Nike might 
have Adidas links displayed.  Companies in opposition to Google’s AdWords system have 
argued that this display will likely confuse potential customers into believing that they are 
entering the company’s website or one affiliated with their brand name search.24  Not only will 
this lead to a potential lost sale, but it might also mean a loss of goodwill when a consumer 
mistakenly believes that an inferior product was associated with a particular brand.
25
  
 Obviously, brand owners can purchase brand specific search terms, but some have argued 
that this can be viewed as Google free riding on the goodwill of the brand owner and profiting 
merely because a brand owner wants to thwart a competitor from purchasing search terms.
26
  
They argue that Google wins whether the brand owner purchased the search words or not.
27
 
However, non-owner purchasers of brand names may be found to have infringed a trademark 
right. In response to allegations that Google is infringing upon trademark rights and profiting 
                                                          
21
 Id. 
22
 Rosetta Stone, Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (citing Google, Securities and Exchange Commission: Form S-1 
Registration Statement 10 (2004), available at http:// i.i.com.com/cnwk.1d/pdf/ne/2004/google.pdf (“[a]dverse 
results in these lawsuits may result in, or even compel, a change in this practice which could result in a loss of 
revenue for us, which could harm our business.”). 
23
 Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 125. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. 
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3 
from these infringements, Google created a “Trust and Safety Team,” which monitors 
trademarks in sponsored links in order to prevent links to counterfeit websites.
28
 
 This article considers Google’s profiting from the use of another’s brand in its AdWords 
program, and the possibility of AdWords having an adverse effect on the function of trademarks. 
When evaluating whether Google’s profits infringes brand owners’ rights through its use of 
AdWords, courts have typically applied trademark law.
29
 This article argues the Google’s 
AdWords does not, directly, infringe third parties’ trademark rights.  Several courts have 
examined Google’s AdWords, but only two major cases have discussed Google’s AdWords from 
a functionality standpoint.  The Supreme Court should adopt a similar approach as the European 
Union in addressing any trademark issues with respect to AdWords: finding trademark violations 
by Google only if a third party’s use of a search term has an adverse effect on the function of a 
mark and Google knows about this and does not correct it.
30
  This method is not at odds with the 
recent decision in Rosetta Stone which found the functionality doctrine did not apply in that 
case.
31
  Other courts addressing Google’s AdWords focus on a potential “likelihood of 
confusion” and “use” of trademarks as a potential violation.  This methodology is unduly 
burdensome; however, as it focuses individually on each trademark finding Google liable for 
third parties’ misconduct.  Utilizing the functionality test set out by the European Union is a 
superior method to address trademark disputes because looking mainly to adverse effects on the 
function of a mark, while still allowing a case-by-case analysis of potential violations, will 
ensure proper trademark protection and remain loyal to the purpose of trademark law.  This 
article proposes a “nominative functional fair use defense,” as a way for Google to avoid 
                                                          
28
 Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 150 (4th Cir. 2012). 
29
 See for e.g. Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 125; Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 173. 
30
 Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237/08 and C-238/08, Google France Google Inc. v. 
Louis Vuitton Malletier, Google France v. Viaticum Luteciel, Google France v. CNRRH Pierre-Alexis Thonet 
Bruno Raboin Tiger, a franchisee of Unicis, 2009. 
31
 Rosetta Stone, Ltd., 732 F. Supp. 2d at 541. 
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4 
trademark infringement, as it mirrors other fair use defenses to trademark violations. Thus, 
unless Google has knowledge of and does not remedy third party violations, Google’s AdWords 
cannot infringe trademark rights.  
 Part II of this article will discuss relevant case law pertaining to Google’s AdWords 
which have utilized either an amalgam of trademark “use” or “likelihood of confusion” which 
leaves a mess of confusion for potential advertisers.  Part III will discuss functionality as 
analyzed under Rosetta Stone and Google France. Part IV will explain why adopting a standard 
similar to that of the European Union’s through a nominative functional fair use defense is good 
form.   
 
II.   Relevant legal doctrines 
  
 Most of the courts that have addressed Google’s AdWords have extremely wide-ranging 
views.
32
  Google’s “Trust and Safety Team” believed that any disputes over the use of its’ 
AdWords program would likely be resolved between a trademark holder and the advertiser using 
the mark;
33
 however, since Google benefits from the AdWords program, many trademark holders 
have brought suits against Google pursuant to the Lanham Act.
34
  The federal trademark statute, 
the Lanham Act, provides for two main causes of action.
35
  First, causes of action may be 
established for uses that would likely cause confusion.
36
  Second, a cause of action may be made 
                                                          
32
 See e.g. Rosetta Stone Ltd., 676 F.3d at 150; Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 125. 
33
 See Advertising Policies: What is Google's AdWords and AdSense Trademark Policy?, Google, 
http://AdWords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py? hl=en&answer=6118 (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
34
 See, e.g., Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007); Rescuecom Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393; Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. 
Supp. 2d. 700 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
35
 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1)(A)(2006). 
36
 Id. 
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5 
against uses that dilute the value of a famous mark.
37
  Thus, to establish trademark infringement 
under Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) it owns a valid mark; (2) defendant used mark 
in commerce and without plaintiff's authorization; (3) defendant used mark or imitation of it in 
connection with sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services; and (4) 
defendant's use of mark is likely to confuse consumers.
38
 Many of the cases that have addressed 
AdWords, or other similar keyword tools, have found potential trademark violations through 
either “use” or “likelihood of confusion,” and have held varying and often conflicting views.39    
 
A. Trademark use 
 
 Courts have struggled with whether trademarks as a search keyword constitute the type of 
“use in commerce” outlawed by the Lanham Act; keyword searches are distinct from traditional 
trademark “use” as a product identifier.40  Case law is unclear regarding Google’s practice of 
selling trademarks as keywords amounting to “trademark use.”  Those courts that have examined 
AdWords from a “use” perspective are divided as to how broadly the scope of “trademark use” 
should be interpreted.
41
  Those courts in favor of a broad interpretation usually find liability for 
trademark infringement, but those courts who favor a traditional interpretation of “trademark 
use” tend to absolve Google of any liability.42  Thus, this section addresses the varying court 
opinions regarding whether keyword searches can constitute “use in commerce” to violate the 
                                                          
37
 Id. 
38
 Lanham Act, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(a). 
39
 See supra note 32. 
40
 See Roger Colaizzi, A Discussion of Internet-Related Trademark Cases and Trademark Fraud, in Recent Trends in 
Trademark Protection: Leading Lawyers on Analyzing Recent Decisions in Trademark Law 41, 45 (Oct. 1, 2009), 
available at 2009 WL 3358961. 
41
 Stephanie Yu Lim, Can Google Be Liable for Trademark Infringement? A Look at the "Trademark Use" 
Requirement As Applied to Google AdWords, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 265, 266 (2007). 
42
 Id. 
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6 
Lanham Act, and demonstrate the necessity for a clearer standard to evaluate trademark 
infringement for keyword searches.  
 For example in GEICO, the court utilized a broad definition of trademark use and 
denied Google's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff adequately alleged trademark use.
43
  
GEICO asserted that when Google sold the rights to link advertising to the plaintiff's trademarks 
it was using the trademarks in commerce without receiving permission from GEICO.
44
  The 
court went on to distinguish the facts of this case from the WhenU line of cases in which the 
alleged “trademark use” was the use of the trademark in the internal computer coding of pop-up 
software.
45
  The WhenU cases involved software called “SaveNow” which responded to a 
computer user's “activities by generating relevant pop-up advertisements.46  The WhenU cases 
concluded that such a use did not constitute  “trademark use” under the Lanham Act because the 
pop-up ads did not place the trademarks in question in commerce.  The GEICO court found the 
WhenU cases distinguishable because WhenU did not market the trademarks as keywords to 
which advertisers could directly purchase rights.
47
 Thus, the court’s broad interpretation of “use 
in commerce” necessitated a finding of liability for trademark infringement due to third party 
advertisers’ ability to purchase trademarks as keywords. 
 Similarly, in 800-JR Cigar v. GoTo.com, JR Cigar sued the Internet search engine, 
GoTo.com and under a broad definition of trademark use found trademark infringement.
48
  
GoTo.com sold ads tied to search terms and offered an automated “Search Term Suggestion 
Tool,” very similar to Google’s key word search.49  JR Cigar argued that GoTo.com violated the 
                                                          
43
 Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. 
48
 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 277 (D.N.J. 2006). 
49
 Id. 
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7 
Lanham Act because it: (1) profited from the unauthorized sale of its trademarks as search terms 
to GoTo.com's customers; (2) used the JR marks to attract search customers to its site; and (3) 
created and implemented a scheme to divert Internet users seeking to find “jr cigar” to JR Cigar's 
competitors and rivals.
50
  The court found that GoTo made “trademark use” of the JR marks in 
three ways: (1) GoTo traded on the value of the marks by accepting bids from those competitors 
of JR desiring to pay for prominence in search results; (2) GoTo injected itself into the 
marketplace by acting as a conduit to steer potential customers away from JR to JR's 
competitors, ranking its paid advertisers before any “natural” listings in a search results list; and 
(3) through the “Search Term Suggestion Tool,” GoTo identified those of JR's marks which are 
effective search terms and marketed them to JR's competitors.
51
 Thus, the court’s broad 
definition of trademark use led to a holding of trademark infringement. 
 However, in Rescuecom v. Google, the court utilized a more traditional definition of 
trademark use and found no infringement by Google, but was overturned, demonstrating that 
even within circuits courts varied on what constitutes trademark use. Rescuecom argued 
that Google's actions amounted to trademark infringement because: (1) defendant attempted to 
“free-ride” on the good will associated with Rescuecom and its activities caused confusion; (2) 
defendant's activities lured Internet searchers away and prevented them from reaching plaintiff's 
website; (3) defendant's activities altered the search results an Internet user receives; and (4) 
defendant used Rescuecom's trademarks internally as a keyword to trigger the appearance of 
competitors' advertisements.
52
  The Northern District Court in New York found that 
Rescuecom’s allegations could not establish that Google's AdWords product infringed 
                                                          
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 127. 
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8 
trademarks because there was no allegation of any “trademark use.”53  The court emphasized that 
“use” needed to be alleged as a threshold matter and was separate from the “in commerce” or 
“likelihood of confusion” elements.54  Moreover, the court did not find that typing in a trademark 
in a search engine lured Internet searchers away from the plaintiff's website.
55
  Any keyword 
would bring up a both a page showing sponsored links and relevant search results, the plaintiff's 
website.
56
  More importantly, the court reasoned that there was no “use” because Rescuecom’s 
trademark was not in any of the links to competitors and because Google did not affect the 
“appearance or functionality of plaintiff's website.”57  Finally, the court found that an “internal 
use” of a trademark did not amount to a “trademark use” because it did not place the mark on 
any goods, containers, displays or advertisements and because such a use was not visible to the 
public.
58
  However, the Second Circuit overturned this decision, not addressing a possible 
Lanham Act violation, but stated that trademarks used as keyword searches did constitute “use in 
trademark.”59 Thus, although the Northern District Court in New York utilized a traditional 
definition to find no infringement by Google, the Second Circuit overturned this decision finding 
a trademark use for keyword searches. 
 Thus, for even those cases that agreed in addressing keyword searches as a possible “use” 
trademark violation, there are very contrasted outcomes and differing views on what even 
constitutes a “use” of trademark.60 Courts that utilize the traditional definition of use tended to 
find no violation, while those courts that broaden the scope of trademark use found violation. 
Currently, though, there is little firm case law and the “use” issue is controversial and 
                                                          
53
 Id. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 127. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. 
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9 
compelling.
61
 These cases demonstrate the need for national consistency throughout the courts 
because whether a particular keyword purchase and use is fair competition or is trademark 
infringement is uncertain because of the range of potential jurisdictions in which a given case 
may arise.
62
 
 
B. Likelihood of Confusion 
   
 In contrast, some courts have chosen to focus on a “likelihood of confusion” in 
addressing Google’s AdWords. On the point of likelihood of confusion, however, a general 
theme seems to have emerged: if the trademarked keyword is not used within the heading, body 
or URL of the sponsored link or advertisement, there is a decreased likelihood of confusion.
63
  
However, this is not a steadfast rule, courts have disagreed on which factors to apply, and 
examining potential for trademark violations via “likelihood of confusion” requires a detailed 
case-by-case analysis, hence, it is an inefficient standard. 
 In Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc. (ABWF) the Northern 
District Court in California addressed the issue of whether Google's AdWords advertising 
program infringed ABWF's trademarks by selling them as keywords, and chose to focus on the 
potential likelihood of confusion.
64
  The court found that ABWF made sufficient allegations of 
direct infringement by Google.
65
  In coming to its conclusion, the court relied heavily on the 
                                                          
61
 See supra note 40. 
62
 Id. 
63
 See e.g. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (specifically distinguishing sponsored links that contain 
the claimed trademark in the heading or text of the advertisement from those that did not reference the mark 
anywhere in the advertisement); J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 WL 30115 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007) (use but no confusion where defendant used the claimed trademarks in meta tags and as a 
keyword but did not include them in advertisements or links). 
64
 Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2005 WL 832398 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005). 
65
 Id. 
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10 
Ninth Circuit Court's reasoning in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications 
Corp., which addressed the issue of trademark infringement in the context of Internet 
advertising.
66
  In Playboy, when a user entered specific terms into search engines, advertisements 
keyed to the terms would appear as banner ads running along the top or side of the search-results 
page.
67
  The list of terms that related to adult-oriented entertainment contained the plaintiff's 
trademarks: “playboy” and “playmate.”68  The Ninth Circuit ultimately denied Google’s motion 
for summary judgment as to trademark infringement due to a finding of adequate evidence of 
initial interest confusion in the appearance of the unlabeled banner ads because they led users to 
competitor advertisers' web sites.
69
  Finding that the facts in the current case were sufficiently 
analogous to those in Playboy, the court held that ABWF could state sufficient facts to allege a 
trademark infringement claim.
70
  Thus, the court held Google's AdWords advertising program 
infringed ABWF's trademarks by selling them as keywords due to the likelihood of confusion. 
 To further muddy the waters in analyzing AdWords, at least two courts have addressed 
both violations of trademark via “use” and “likelihood of confusion,” finding differently on the 
latter aspect.  First, the court in 800-JR Cigar v. GoTo.com, also addressed a potential likelihood 
of confusion, not just the “use” mentioned supra.71  As to the “likelihood of confusion” element, 
the court applied the ten-part analysis known as the Lapp factors and determined that a 
likelihood of confusion had in fact, existed.
72
  Second, in Rescuecom, addressing the “likelihood 
of confusion,” the court applied a multifactor test set forth in AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats.73 
                                                          
66
 Id.  
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. 
69
 Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2005 WL 832398. 
70
 Id. 
71
 800-JR Cigar, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 277. 
72
 Id. 
73
 AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 n.11 (9th Cir. 1979) (listing the factors as follows: (1) similarity 
of conflicting marks; (2) proximity of the two companies' products or services; (3) strength of the plaintiff's mark; 
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This aspect of violation of the Lanham Act was harder for the court to settle due to savvy 
Internet searchers’ unlikelihood of confusion regarding search engine sponsored links. 74 
Consequently, while both 800-JR Cigar and Rescuecom agreed in addressing potential keyword 
search violations as either a trademark use violation or under likelihood of confusion, the courts 
did not agree as to the outcome of a potential violation under likelihood of confusion.  
 Accordingly, these courts addressing AdWords’ potential violations of trademark 
demonstrate the contrasting views presented by the courts. Not only do courts disagree as to 
whether to apply trademark “use” or “likelihood of confusion,” but also, courts differ as to which 
factors adequately determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion regarding a trademark.
75
  
Therefore, these cases strongly demonstrate the need for a clearer standard in evaluating possible 
trademark infringement. 
 
III. Functionality  
  
 Along with the many variations in addressing Google’s AdWords, at least two courts 
have addressed it from a functionality standpoint. Trademarks are different from patents and 
copyrights because consumers have a continuing interest in protecting trademark owners’ 
exclusive rights in marks while, aside from incentives, consumers would like free access to 
patented inventions and copyrighted expressions; because of that difference, functionality exists, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(4) marketing channels used by the two companies; (5) degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers in 
selecting goods; (6) defendant's intent when selecting the mark; (7) evidence of actual consumer confusion; and (8) 
likelihood of expansion of product lines.). 
74
 Rachel R. Friedman, No Confusion Here: Proposing a New Paradigm for the Litigation of Keyword Advertising 
Trademark Infringement Cases, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 355, 371 (2010) (citing AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 
599 F.2d 341, 348 n.11 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
75
 See e.g. 800-JR Cigar, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273 at 277 (using the Lapp factors to discern a likelihood of 
confusion); see also Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 127 (using factors set out in Sleekcraft, see supra note 73); see 
also infra Part III’s discussion of Rosetta Stone. 
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12 
and there may be more leeway to allow Google to proceed with its AdWords and keyword 
searches without infringing upon intellectual property rights.  Although this attribution of 
trademark law differentiates it from the other types of patent law, until recently, courts have not 
focused on functionality in discussing Google’s AdWords campaign or other similar trademark 
issues. The two main cases that address functionality are seemingly different, but can be 
reconciled in order to provide a clear standard to evaluate potential trademark violations for 
AdWords. 
 The first case that addresses functionality is Rosetta Stone.  Rosetta Stone brought a 
claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act against Google.
76
   Rosetta Stone is a 
business that marketed language-learning software under the brand name “Rosetta Stone” and 
had several other registered marks in connection with its’ business.77  In 2009, after developing 
technology to check linked websites to determine the validity of trademarks, Google 
implemented a policy to permit the use of trademarks in advertising text in four situations.
78
  
Rosetta Stone alleged that this policy was causing searchers to purchase counterfeit versions of 
their products and lead to consumer confusion.
79
  Accordingly, Rosetta Stone asserted several 
claims against Google: (1) direct trademark infringement under the Lanham Act; (2) contributory 
trademark infringement; (3) vicarious trademark infringement; (4) trademark dilution; and (5) 
unjust enrichment.
80
  The district court held “[n]otwithstanding a favorable finding 
for Google under the relevant infringement elements, the functionality doctrine protect[d] 
                                                          
76
 Rosetta Stone Ltd., 676 F.3d at 150. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. at 151-52. The four situations include: (1) the sponsor is a reseller of a genuine trademarked product; (2) the 
sponsor makes or sells component parts for a trademarked product; (3) the sponsor offers compatible parts or goods 
for use with the trademarked product; or (4) the sponsor provides information about or reviews a trademarked 
product. 
79
 Id. at 150. 
80
 Id. 
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13 
Google's use of the Rosetta Stone Marks as keyword triggers.” 81   The functionality doctrine 
features protection under trademark law, if trademarked keywords are functional they may not 
receive trademark protection. A product feature is functional, “if it is essential to the use or 
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”82  The court also found 
AdWords’ “keywords ha[d] an essential indexing function because they enable[d] Google to 
readily identify in its databases relevant information in response to a web user's query.” 83  
Further, the court stated, “the keywords affect the cost and quality of Google's 
AdWords program because absent third party advertisers' ability to bid on trademarked terms as 
keyword triggers, Google would be required to create an alternative system for displaying paid 
advertisements on its website.” 84   The court stated that altering or removing the AdWords 
program would be “potentially more costly and less effective in generating relevant 
advertisements.”85  Therefore, the court held that Google’s use of trademarked keywords was a 
functional part of Google's product, and therefore the functionality doctrine prevented trademark 
infringement.
86
  
 However, the appellate court in Rosetta Stone overturned the district court’s finding as to 
functionality. Stating that functionality developed as a way to preserve the distinction between 
the realms of trademark and patent law, the appellate court took issue with the district court 
opinion stating that: 
The district court did not conclude, nor could it, that Rosetta 
Stone's marks were functional product features or that Rosetta 
Stone's own use of this phrase was somehow functional. Instead, 
                                                          
81
 Rosetta Stone Ltd., 676 F.3d at 150. 
82
 Id. at 545 citing TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001). 
83
 Id. at 545. 
84
 Id. 
85
 Rosetta Stone Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 2d at 545. 
86
 Id. at 540. 
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the district court concluded that trademarked keywords—be it 
ROSETTA STONE or any other mark—are “functional” when 
entered into Google's AdWords program . . . The functionality 
doctrine simply does not apply in these circumstances. The 
functionality analysis below was focused on whether Rosetta 
Stone's mark made Google's product more useful, neglecting to 
consider whether the mark was functional as Rosetta Stone used it. 
Rosetta Stone uses its registered mark as a classic source identifier 
in connection with its language learning products. Clearly, there is 
nothing functional about Rosetta Stone's use of its own mark; use 
of the words “Rosetta Stone” is not essential for the functioning of 
its language-learning products, which would operate no differently 
if Rosetta Stone had branded its product “SPHINX” instead of 
ROSETTA STONE.
87
 
 Thus, the appellate court overturned the district court opinion in Rosetta Stone finding 
that the functionality doctrine cannot be a defense for Google from trademark infringement 
because the district court’s analysis was focused on making Google’s product more useful not 
whether the mark was functional as Rosetta Stone utilized it.    
 Second, the European Court of Justice addressed Google’s AdWords from a unique 
functionality standpoint in issuing a major opinion in 2010.
88
  First, the court held that Google 
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was not “involved in use [of a mark] in the course of trade.”89  Secondly, the court held that the 
key-word buying advertiser, is “involved in use” of the mark “in the course of trade” and “in 
relation to goods or services.”90  Finally, for advertisers to be liable for trademark infringement, 
their use of a mark must have an adverse effect on one or more of the essential functions of the 
mark.
91
  So, with respect to “function of indicating origin,” the adverse effect depends upon the 
exact presentation made to the searcher, or how clear the advertisement is regarding its sponsor 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
92
   The court expounded upon this test stating: 
 
In the case where a third party's ad suggests that there is an 
economic link between that third party and the proprietor of the 
trade mark, the conclusion must be that there is an adverse effect 
on the function of indicating origin.  In the case where the ad, 
while not suggesting the existence of an economic link, is vague to 
such an extent on the origin of the goods or services at issue that 
normally informed and reasonably attentive internet users are 
unable to determine, on the basis of the advertising link and the 
commercial message attached thereto, whether the advertiser is a 
third party vis-à-vis the proprietor of the trade mark or, on the 
contrary, economically linked to that proprietor, the conclusion 
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must also be that there is an adverse effect on that function of the 
trade mark.
93
 
 
In specifically addressing Google’s AdWords campaign, the court held that there was not an 
adverse effect on the “advertising function” of the marks because the listing for the mark’s 
proprietor would appear unaltered high in the relevant search results presented to the searcher.
94
  
Further, an advertiser who bought a keyword in connection with a keyword such as “copy” or 
“imitation,” and then used the resulting advertising to sell the same type of merchandise as 
offered under that mark was acting illegally.
95
  But, Google was not acting illicitly because it was 
not “involved in using” the mark.96  Further, the court held that Google could not be held liable 
for the actions of advertisers who used its keyword service unless Google was found to have 
“played an active role” in the content of the advertisement or, if Google was aware of the 
unlawful nature of the advertiser’s activities and failed to “act expeditiously to remove or to 
disable access to the data concerned.”97  Therefore, Google was protected from infringement 
violations because it was not involved in the use of trademarks, and could only be found liable if 
it knew a third party advertiser was using a mark which resulted in an adverse effect on one of 
the mark’s essential functions. 
 Although seemingly different, Google France is not at odds with Rosetta Stone.  Rather, 
it provides a clearer standard to identify trademark violations than those cases that discuss “use” 
and “likelihood of confusion.”  More specifically, the numerous counterfeit products sold in 
Rosetta Stone, is exactly the type of behavior that Google France makes illicit and seeks to 
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provide indirect liability for Google. Google France does not propose that Google should be 
afforded the functionality doctrine as a way to avoid trademark violation, which is what Rosetta 
Stone specifically rejects, but rather sets out the standard that courts should look to any adverse 
effect on the function and purpose of a trademark by a third party advertiser, and Google can 
only be indirectly liable if it knew of this infringement and did nothing to correct it. Therefore, 
Rosetta Stone and Google France are easily reconciled in order to provide a clear standard to 
evaluate potential trademark violations for AdWords. 
 
IV. Implementing the European Union’s test to fit American laws as a defense 
 
 Google France has provided the clearest and best standard to determine trademark 
violations through AdWords, and would best be implemented in the United States as a 
nominative functional fair use defense.  Here, there is no question by either the European Union 
court or the court in Rosetta Stone that Google uses plaintiff’s marks through its AdWords’ 
program.
98
  However, Google should not be responsible for direct violations of trademark and 
should instead be afforded protection under a “nominative functional fair use defense,” as 
Google only allows third parties to use trademarks as needed to identify their products. Section A 
first addresses why a nominative functional fair use defense squarely fits into American 
jurisprudence. Section B addresses a nominative functional fair use defense’s positive effects on 
the economy by discussing: competition, searcher sophistication, and product proximity as it 
relates to Google’s AdWords.  Conforming to established American law and providing positive 
effects on competition demonstrate that a nominative functional fair use defense is the best way 
to address possible trademark infringements by AdWords. 
                                                          
98
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A. Nominative Functional Fair Use Defense and American Jurisprudence 
 
 A nominative functional fair use defense fits with already established American law. Fair 
use allows advertisers to utilize other’s marks in a non-trademark sense. Nominative fair use 
provides a three-pronged test, which allows parties to use other’s trademarks for purely 
descriptive purposes, or to demonstrate product attributions. Functionality distinguished 
trademark from patent law by allowing third parties to utilize other’s marks in order to protect 
competition.  Thus, instituting a nominative functional fair use defense properly affords Google’s 
AdWords protection against potential trademark violations.  
 A fair use defense can be easily applied to AdWords. The traditional fair use defense is 
an affirmative defense to trademark infringement, utilized only after a finding that a defendant 
has used the plaintiff’s mark.99  Section 115(b)(4) sets out the defense mandating that fair use 
requires the use of another’s trademark in a non-trademark sense, including for purposes of 
criticism or comparison.
100
  A successful fair use defendant either does not use a mark as a 
trademark, or only uses the mark as needed to identify its own product.
101
  An example of this 
is Volkswagenwerk, where the Ninth Circuit held that Volkswagen could not prevent an 
automobile repair shop from using its mark.
102
  The court recognized that in “advertising [the 
repair of Volkswagens, it] would be difficult, if not impossible, for [defendant] to avoid 
altogether the use of the word ‘Volkswagen’ or its abbreviation ‘VW,’ which are the normal 
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terms which, to the public at large, signify appellant's cars.”103  Similarly, Google’s AdWords 
only allows third parties to use others’ trademarks as needed to identify their own products, and 
thus a fair use defense is properly applied.  
 Similarly, the nominative fair use defense is easily applied to AdWords.  The Ninth 
Circuit first enunciated the nominative fair use defense, which allows a person to use the 
trademark of another as a reference to describe or compare his or her own product, in New Kids 
on the Block.
104
 The nominative fair use defense requires: (1) the product or service in question 
must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) only as much of the mark 
may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and (3) the user must 
do nothing in conjunction with the mark that would suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the 
trademark holder.
105
 As to the first and second elements, Google’s AdWords allows third parties 
to utilize trademarks only for descriptive purposes or to demonstrate product attribute worth. 
Google only allows third parties to purchase keyword terms as needed to identify its own 
products.  The final element reflects the European Union’s test that finds Google liable only if it 
knows that a third party is using another’s trademark that negatively affects an essential function 
of the mark, such as suggesting ownership or sponsorship.  Consequently, the three-pronged 
nominative test is properly applied to Google AdWords.  
 Further, naming this defense nominative functional fair use defense is congruent with 
settled American jurisprudence and is fitting for AdWords. Trademarks are used typically for 
four purposes: to identify goods and distinguish them from goods sold by others; to demonstrate 
that goods bearing a trademark are controlled by a single entity; to demonstrate goods bearing 
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the same trademark are of equal quality; and for marketing.
106
  A unique distinction of trademark 
law is the functionality doctrine.
107
  This doctrine prevents manufacturers from protecting 
specific features of a product by means of trademark law, and contains two branches: utilitarian 
functionality
108
 and aesthetic
109
 functionality.
110
  The rationale for the functionality doctrine was 
interest in free competition.
111
  For example, if there is demand for an item’s function, then 
allocating trademark status would “confer an improper monopoly on a needed configuration or 
structure.” 112   Moreover, “the purpose of the rule precluding trademark significance for 
functional features is to prevent the grant of a perpetual monopoly to features which cannot be 
patented.”113  Looking only to this individual section of the law, “one could ascribe to the patent 
laws protection of those utilitarian features which Congress has chosen to protect, and to the 
trademark law protection of fanciful or arbitrary features which have achieved recognition as 
indicia of origin.” 114   Those trademarks that do not receive patent protection but are still 
functional are available for third parties to imitate or copy.
115
  Consequently, “[o]ur natural 
inclination to disapprove of such conduct must give way to the public policy favoring 
competition, even by slavish copying, of products not entitled to federal patent protection.”116 
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Thus, affording protection to Google’s AdWords from settled functional law provides protection 
of competition and dissuades monopolization. 
 Hence, a nominative functional fair use defense fits with already established American 
law and is easily applicable to AdWords. Fair use provides third party advertisers a way to utilize 
other’s marks in a either a descriptive or comparative way. Nominative fair use provides a three-
pronged test, which emulates the standard set out by Google France.  Functionality allows third 
parties to utilize other’s marks in order to protect competition.  Thus, instituting a nominative 
functional fair use defense properly affords Google’s AdWords protection against potential 
trademark violations, and easily fits within American case law precedent. 
 
B. Nominative Functional Fair Use Defense’s positive effects on the Economy 
 
 Implementing a nominative functional fair use defense for Google’s AdWords and 
disallowing direct liability for trademark infringement is reasonable because it provides positive 
effects on the economy. Competition is served by preventing monopolization while still 
protecting businesses’ goodwill. Searchers are sophisticated and not likely confused by 
AdWords, but in fact are better able to compare products. Products should be allowed close 
proximity in AdWords, as proximity in physical relation is not only allowed, but occurs 
frequently, and again, provides for better comparison shopping. Thus, the positive effects on 
competition, searcher sophistication, and product proximity demonstrate instituting a nominative 
functional fair use defense is the best way to address AdWords’ possible trademark 
infringements. 
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 From a competition perspective, the rule that trademark law does not give mark owners 
the right to monopolize their marks
 
applies with even more force on a search engine results page 
(“SERP”),117 where consumers exert substantial influence over which trademarks they wish to 
see.
118
  On the SERP, a brand's goodwill comes not only from the brand's own paid and organic 
results, but also comes from consumer word-of-mouth like social media.  Additionally, in paid 
searches, consumers exert influence over ads.
119
  Providing brand owners the legal power to 
control search results is not in the consumers’ best interests, but rather, it demonstrates an effort 
to monopolize and control the market.
120
  Moreover, many court cases have demonstrated that by 
looking at the amount of money brand owners have lost from competitive keyword advertising as 
opposed to the cost of litigation, it simply was not worth it.
121
  Furthermore, trademark law does 
not provide mark owners the right to exclude SERP competition.
122
  Giving absolute control over 
trademarks on the SERP can stifle competition by erecting barriers to entry. 
 
Competitors often
123
 
have the right to use others' trademarks to divert consumer attention to their own 
products.
124
  Consequently, those parties who argue that Google is infringing trademark rights 
because they are taking advantage of other brands’ goodwill are incorrect.125  Brand spillover has 
always occurred, third parties often take advantage of another companies’ goodwill.126  This 
free-rider argument is nothing more than fair competition providing consumers with better 
market access.  Google only created the medium. The advertisers' consumers use the medium in 
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droves because it provides the most relevant answers to their queries.
127
  Thus, the responsible 
advertiser must follow its consumer to Google. Thus, trademark law's goals are to prevent 
consumer confusion and encourage competition, which spurs innovation.
128
  The threat of direct 
liability for keyword-based advertising services chills innovation against the best interests of 
consumers.
129
  As stated by the Supreme Court in Samara: “Competition is deterred, however, 
not merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit.”130  For Google’s 
AdWords, trademark law should not be used to restrict competition and innovation, especially in 
the absence of consumer confusion.
131
  
 Turning to the absence of consumer confusion, another reason for adopting a nominative 
functional fair use defense for Google’s AdWords is that online searchers are sophisticated. 
Consumers often base their purchase decisions on trademarks by using them as quality 
indicators.
132
  Brands provide value to consumers by reducing search costs; if a consumer 
recognizes a brand and associates it with good quality, they need look no further.
133
  Therefore, 
some have argued that consumers are more likely to shop online because they rely on trademarks 
as a purchasing guide.
134
  Consumers are reassured that the goods or products will be of the same 
quality as previously purchased items bearing the same trademark.
135
  Most of the search 
information provided that addresses online shoppers and Google constituents is obtained by 
plaintiff’s counsel, so inherently most of the studies are skewed and present searchers as 
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incompetent and easily confused.  However, of those few unbiased studies, it has been revealed 
that searchers are seemingly sophisticated.
136
  For example, consumers deploy many search 
strategies, including using a well-known brand as a proxy for the class of goods.
137
  This means 
that although a consumer types in the term “Nike,” they are open to any result that appears 
including those that come from Adidas. Consumers use search engines to comparison shop, 
which includes evaluating different brands. Thus, the nominative functional fair use defense 
should be adopted because consumers are sophisticated enough to distinguish between different 
brands on the SERP, and “[i]f they see trademarks that overlap, they will adapt and deal with that 
environment.”138  
 Finally, although some argue that the close proximity of third party advertiser’s to 
trademark owners’ marks should restrict AdWords, trademark owners frequently and legally pay 
to appear in close proximity to their competitors in advertisements.
139
  “Physical proximity 
creates an association between the concepts, but not necessarily an association as to source.”140  
Physical proximity of brands does not confuse the type reasonable and sophisticated consumers 
who search online, but rather, it is branding that provides customers with the intellect to choose a 
product.  Branding provides economic value to businesses in several ways.
141
  First, it is a unique 
way to identify a company and the product quality associated with it, along with the ability to 
charge a premium price for that quality association.
142
  Second, it is more efficient from an 
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advertising standpoint and as a platform to introduce new products.
143
  Third, it allows for 
market segmentation, targeting, and product repositioning.
144
  Customers who frequent grocery 
stores recognize that if they are searching for peanut butter, they will likely find all of the brands 
of peanut butter next to each other on one aisle. If trademark owners can pay to appear next to 
each other offline, they should be able to do the same online. Thus, the Lanham Act “should not 
be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers.”145 
 Thus, implementing a nominative functional fair use defense for Google’s AdWords and 
disallowing direct liability for trademark infringement is logical because antitrust doctrines and 
branding demonstrate a nominative functional fair use defense provides better economic policy 
by providing protection against monopolies while searcher sophistication, and product proximity 
provide the kind of competitive market that benefits consumer decision making, and is congruent 
with the American ideology of a capitalist society.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 Thus, in conclusion, Google’s AdWords does not, directly, infringe third parties’ 
trademark rights.  Although several courts have examined Google’s AdWords, only two major 
cases have discussed Google’s AdWords from a functionality standpoint.  The Supreme Court 
should adopt a similar approach as the European Union’s approach in addressing any trademark 
issues with respect to AdWords: finding trademark violations by Google only if a third party’s 
use of a search term has an adverse effect on the function of a mark and Google knows about this 
and does not correct it.  This method is not at odds with the recent decision in Rosetta Stone 
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which found the functionality doctrine was not applicable to AdWords.  Other courts addressing 
Google’s AdWords focus on a potential “likelihood of confusion” and “use” of trademarks as a 
potential violation.  This methodology is unduly burdensome; however, as it focuses individually 
on each trademark finding Google liable for third parties’ misconduct.  Utilizing the functionality 
test set out by the European Union is a superior method to address trademark disputes because 
looking mainly to functionality, while still allowing a case-by-case analysis of potential 
violations, will ensure proper trademark protection.  The best way to implement the European 
Union’s standard set out in Google France is to adopt a “nominative functional fair use defense” 
as a way for Google to avoid trademark infringement, as it mirrors other fair use defenses to 
trademark violations because third party advertisers are only using trademark terms as needed to 
identify their products.  Thus, unless Google has knowledge of and does not remedy third party 
violations, Google’s AdWords cannot infringe trademark rights because it has a nominative 
functional fair use defense.  
